Interpreting Words About God: Part 4 of 5, "Analogy Must Be the Rule"

• Monday) "Test case: Genesis": Authorial use of anthropomorphic language.
• Tuesday) "Bugs on a quarter": A very brief introduction for the following two days that will discuss Creator-creature relationship, the archetypal-ectypal distinction, and univocal vs. equivocal vs. analogous interpretation. We will explore the power of accommodative truth.
• Wednesday) "The Creator-creature Distinction": The Creator-creature ontological relationship and the archetypal-ectypal distinction.
• Today) "Analogy Must Be the Rule": The argument advocating use of only analogous interpretation for ALL words attributed to what God does and about who He is.
• Friday) "An answer to the critics of analogy and closing remarks": That pretty much sums it up.

Today, I continue to relay more of Horton's article that I referenced last post. I believe this continues to build the case that analogous interpretation must be the rule when we read words in Scripture that speak about what God does and who He is.

When we assert certain predicates of God, based on God’s own self-revelation, we use them in one of three senses: univocally, analogically or equivocally. If we say that the predicate ‘gracious’ means exactly the same thing, whether in God or in a creature, we are using ‘gracious’ univocally. At the other end of the spectrum, if we say that by using that predicate we are ascribing something to God whose appropriateness is unknown to us, we are using it equivocally. If, however, God is said to be ‘gracious’ in a way that is both similar and dissimilar to creatures, we say it is analogical. For instance, when we acknowledge that God is a ‘person,’ do we really mean to say that he is a person in exactly the same sense as we are? When we follow Scripture in using male pronouns to refer to God, do we really believe that he is male? Unless we are willing to ascribe to God (in a univocal sense) all attributes of human personhood, predications must be analogical.

Human language cannot transcend its finitude, so when God reveals himself in human language, he draws on human analogies to lead us by the hand to himself. It is correct description, but not univocal description. As we [have argued], the univocal approach to such language almost always tends toward rationalism and the suspicion of the mystery inherent in the Creator-creature distinction. And equivocal approaches, such as those adopted in some forms of mysticism and in the wake of Kant, denying any certainty about the truth of our predications, tend toward skepticism under the guise of God’s mysterious incomprehensibility.

Thus, [we] do not use analogy as a fall-back strategy when [we] find something that does not fit the system. Rather, it is ... a necessary implication of the Creator-creature relationship as [we should] understand it. All of God’s self-revelation is analogical, not just some of it. ... Just as God comes down to us in the incarnation in order to save us who could not ascend to him, he meets us in Scripture by descending to our weakness. Thus, not only is God’s transcendence affirmed, but his radical immanence as well. Transcendence and immanence become inextricably bound up with the divine drama of redemption. Revelation no less than redemption is an act of condescension and grace.

Tomorrow I will end this series (for now) with one last excerpt from Horton's article that addresses those who are uncomfortable with the analogous approach. It will follow with some final comments from me.

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